Author: Robin

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA [SAMAN PEMULA NO. CB-24NCC-5-10/2024]

Robin

Dalam perkara Pink Zone Sdn Bhd [No Syarikat (822951-W)]; Dan 200801021633 Dalam perkara mengenai kegagalan membayar hasil-hasil jualan kayukayu balak kepunyaan Pink Zone Sdn Bhd di Kompartmen 19 dan 20, Hutan Simpan Balok, Mukim Sungai Karang, Daerah Kuantan, Pahang seluas 224.61 ekar; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Aturan 5 Kaedah 3, dan/atau Aturan 7 Kaedah 2 dan/atau Aturan 28 dan/atau Aturan 88 Kaedah 2 Kaedah-Kaedah 2012 dan bidangkuasa sedia ada Mahkamah serta peruntukanperuntukan lain yang berkaitan; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 345, Seksyen 347, Seksyen 348 dan Seksyen 350 Akta Syarikat 2016. ANTARA YAP CHUNG KWAN (NO. K/P. 890105-06-5773) 1. 2. KHO KOK LIM (NO. K/P: 850227-06-5505) KHO CHEE KIAT (NO. K/P: 580702-06-5225) [kedua-dua dituntut sebagai rakan kongsi Swan Yik Enterprise (No. Pendaftaran: 201403319999] DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN

ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN

Pendahuluan

1. PLAINTIF DAN … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN Ini adalah permohonan Plaintif untuk satu tindakan terbitan (derivative action) di bawah Akta Syarikat 2016. Plaintif memohon perintah-perintah seperti yang berikut:

(i) Plaintif diberi keizinan oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini di bawah Seksyen 347 Akta Syarikat 2016 untuk memulakan prosiding terbitan (“Derivative Proceedings”) bagi pihak Pink Zone Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat 200801021633 (822951-W)] ke atas Defendan Pertama, Kho Kok Lim (No. K/P: 850227065505) dan Defendan Ke-2, Kho Chee Kiat (No. K/P: 58070206-5225);

(ii) Sekiranya keizinan diberikan, satu perintah diberikan kepada Plaintif untuk mengawal perjalanan prosiding sehingga selesai;

(iii) Satu perintah bahawa setiausaha syarikat Pink Zone Sdn Bhd untuk memberikan bantuan dan maklumat kepada Plaintif,termasuklah untuk membenarkan pemeriksaan buku syarikat Pink Zone Sdn Bhd

(iv) Bahawa syarikat Pink Zone Sdn Bhd hendaklah membayar fi guaman yang munasabah dan perbelanjaan yang dilakukan oleh Plaintif berkaitan dengan permohonan atau tindakan, atau sementara menunggu kelulusan ini diberikan; atau

(v) Bahawa Defendan-Defendan hendaklah membayar dengan serta-merta kos kepada Plaintif bagi prosiding terbitan ini, dan kos adalah atas dasar indemniti penuh.

2. Plaintif adalah merupakan seorang Pengarah kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd. Defendan Pertama adalah Pengarah Bersama dan pemegang saham masing-masing 50 % dalam Pink Zone Sdn Bhd. Defendan Kedua adalah bapa kepada Defendan Pertama. Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua merupakan rakan kongsi kepada firma Swan Yik Enterprise.

3. Defendan Pertama mendakwa bahawa sebagai Pengarah dan pemegang saham di dalam Pink Zone dia mempunyai kewajipan fidusiari untuk bertindak demikian kepentingan terbaik Pink Zone Sdn Bhd.

4. Pink Zone Sdn Bhd telah memohon satu konsensi pembalakan di Hutan Simpan Balok, Mukim Sungai Karang, Daerah Kuantan, Pahang pada 18.10.2019 dan 29.01.2020.

5. Pink Zone Sdn Bhd telah berjaya memperolehi konsensi pembalakan seluas 224.61 ekar di Kompartmen 19 dan 20, Hutan Simpan Balok, Mukim Sungai Karang, Daerah Kuantan, Pahang

6. Lesen pembalakan bertarikh 06.04.2022 telah dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Perhutanan Negeri Pahang untuk tempoh 01.04.2022 hingga 31.03.2023 dan Swan Yik Enterprise telah dinamakan sebagai kontraktor pembalakan dalam lesen pembalakan tersebut.

7. Pelantikan Swan Yik Enterprise sebagai kontraktor pembalakan adalah berdasarkan kepada kepercayaan bahawa Swan Yik Enterprise akan dibayar RM 50 setiap tan sebagai upah pengendalian kerja berdasarkan kepada jumlah kayu-kayu yang dikeluarkan dari konsensi pembalasan tersebut.

8. Swan Yik Enterprise juga bertanggungjawab untuk melantik dan membayar sub kontraktor dan menguruskan semua perbelanjaan berkaitan. Swan Yik Enterprise juga dikehendaki membayar kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd selepas ditolak dengan perbelanjaanperbelanjaan pembalakan yang berkaitan.

9. Plaintif di dalam affidavit sokongan permohonan ini telah mendakwa bahawa kayu-kayu yang dikeluarkan dari konsensi pembalakan tersebut telah dijual oleh Swan Yik Enterprise dan keseluruhan jualannya adalah RM 8,455,172.65. Ia telah disokong oleh penyata penjualan kayu-kayu yang ditandakan sebagai eksibit “YCK-5”.

10. Plaintif mendakwa setakat 30.09.2022 tiada sebarang bayaran dibuat oleh Swan Yik Enterprise kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd walaupun terdapat banyak surat tuntutan dikemukakan termasuklah surat bertarikh 21.05.2024.

11. Plaintif mendakwa ekoran daripada tindakan Swan Yik Enterprise yang gagal membuat pembayaran kepada Pink Zone Enterprise ia merupakan satu perlanggan tanggungjawab fidusiari Defendan Pertama kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd. Pink Zone Sdn Bhd telah mengalami kerugian ekoran daripada Swan Yik Enterprise tidak membuat pembayaran seperti yang dituntut oleh Pink Zone Sdn Bhd.

12. Plaintif menyatakan bahawa kebenaran wajar diberikan oleh Mahkamah ini bagi membolehkan kepentingan syarikat dilindungi disebabkan Defendan Pertama telah melanggar tugas-tugas fidusiari dan peruntukan-peruntukan di bawah Akta Syarikat 2016. Pada masa yang sama Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan yang bertentangan akibat kedudukannya dalam syarikat Swan Yik Enterprise dan Pink Zone Sdn Bhd tersebut.

13. Sebaliknya Defendan-Defendan dalam affidavit jawapan menafikan bahawa Swan Yik Enterprise ada berhutang dengan Pink Zone Sdn Bhd ekoran daripada perjanjian konsensi pembalakan tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan penyata akaun yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif di dalam eksibit “YCK -6” tidak diaudit dan tidak ditandatangani yang menyebabkan penyata akaun tersebut tidak boleh menjadi asas kepada dakwaan Plaintif.

14. Defendan-Defendan juga menyatakan bahawa penyata akaun itu tidak diautdit dan kesemua cukai yang timbul daripadanya tidak dijelaskan oleh Pink Zone Sdn Bhd kepada pihak berkuasa yang mempunyai urusan berkaitan percukaian. Dalam erti kata lain tiada sebarang cukai dibayar di atas keuntungan yang dikatakan telah diperolehi daripada Swan Yik Enterprise oleh Pink Zone Sdn Bhd.

15. Defendan-Defendan juga dalam affidavit jawapannya menyatakan bahawa kedudukan Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama yang memegang 50 % daripada modal berbayar dalam Pink Zone Sdn Bhd adalah diperolehi daripada pemegang saham terdahulu, Sin See Hwa dan Ng Ooi Wah dan telah dibayar sepenuhnya oleh Swan Yik Enterprise yang Defendan Pertama dan Plaintif dahulunya adalah rakan kongsi.

16. Oleh itu Defendan Pertama mendakwa Plaintif hanyalah pemegang amanah dan saham yang dipegang dalam Pink Zone Sdn Bhd bagi pihak Swan Yik Enterprise. Malahan Defendan Pertama menyatakan bahawa perjanjian penjualan saham di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dengan Sin See Hwa dan Ng Ooi Wah untuk saham Pink Zone Sdn Bhd untuk pembelian RM 3 juta menyatakan bahawa Defendan Pertama dan Plaintif tidak membuat sebarang pembayaran untuk pembelian saham tersebut. Ini dapat dilihat di dalam eksibit affidavit jawapan Defendan di “KKL-2”. Oleh yang demikian pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa permohonan ini adalah dibuat dengan niat jahat oleh Plaintif

Analisa

17. Secara ringkasnya tindakan terbitan di bawah undang-undang syarikat ialah membawa maksud apabila seseorang memulakan tindakan bagi pihak syarikat. Pada amalannya pihak yang memulakan tindakan tersebut adalah seseorang yang tidak mempunyai kawalan di dalam syarikat tersebut. Rasional kepada prosiding ini ialah untuk memastikan pihak yang berkepentingan dalam syarikat tersebut dapat mengambil tindakan untuk mempertahankan kepentingan syarikat.

18. Penelitian kepada kes ini menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif mendakwa bahawa hutang-hutang yang sepatutnya dibayar oleh Swan Yik Enterprise yang tidak dibuat kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd akan menjejaskan kepentingan syarikat. Oleh itu Plaintif memfailkan tindakan ini untuk mendapatkan kebenaran bagi mengemukakan tindakan terbitan tersebut.

19. Seksyen 347 Akta Syarikat 2016 memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

“347 Derivative proceedings

i) A complainant may, with the leave of the Court initiate, intervene in or defend a proceeding on behalf of the company.

ii) Proceedings brought under this section shall be brought in the company’s name.

iii) The right of any person to bring, intervene in, defend or discontinue any proceedings on behalf of a company at common law is abrogated.”

20. Seksyen 348 Akta Syarikat 2016 pula menyatakan seperti yang berikut berkaitan dengan kebenaran daripada Mahkamah:

“348 Leave of Court

1) An application for leave of the Court under section 347 shall be made to the Court without the need for an appearance to be entered.

2) The complainant shall give thirty days’ notice in writing to the directors of his intention to apply for the leave of Court under section 347.

3) Where leave has been granted for an application under section 347, the complainant shall initiate proceedings in Court within thirty days from the grant of leave.

4) In deciding whether or not the leave shall be granted, the Court shall take into account whether-

a) the complainant is acting in good faith; and

b) it appears prima facie to be in the best interest of the company that the application for leave be granted.

5) Any proceedings brought, intervened in or defended under this section shall not be discontinued, compromised or settled except with the leave of the Court.”

21. Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memberikan penjelasan yang kompresensif berkenaan dengan ujian untuk pemberian kebenaran di bawah seksyen 348 Akta Syarikat 2016 dalam kes Dato’ Seri Timor Shah Rafiq v. Nautilus Tug & Towage Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2024] 4 CLJ 499.

22. Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan berkenaan dengan dua elemen yang perlu ada dalam seksyen 348 Akta Syarikat 2016 tersebut dengan menyatakan seperti yang berikut:

The second issue which merits consideration relates to the standard of review for assessing leave applications to initiate the statutory derivative action under s. 348 of the CA 2016. The dual elements of “good faith” and especially “it appears prima facie to be in the best interest of the company” in the application for leave under s. 348(4)(b) has generated some discussion as to the nature of the threshold required for leave to be granted.

23. Setelah merujuk kepada beberapa kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah berkenaan dengan secara ikhlas atau jujur (good faith) Mahkamah Persekutuan telah merumuskan ujian seperti yang berikut:

It may therefore be surmised that the test for assessing honest belief comprises of both subjective and objective components, namely whether the applicant honestly believes that a good cause of action exists and has a reasonable prospect of success (subjective component), and the applicant may be disbelieved if no reasonable person in the circumstances could hold that belief (objective component).

24. Begitu juga berkenaan dengan kepentingan syarikat dalam menimbangkan kebenaran untuk tindakan terbitan, Mahkamah Persekutuan juga setelah meneliti kes-kes yang berkaitan merumuskan seperti yang berikut:

In the end the question of whether it is prima facie in the best interest of the company to bring an action is a wide one involving consideration of factors beyond the merits of the proceedings. So, broadly speaking, apart from the prospects of success of the action, other factors are the likely costs of the action including legal fees, likely recovery if the action is successful and likely consequences to the company if the action is unsuccessful.

25. Berdasarkan kepada garis panduan yang dinyatakan dalam kes Dato’ Seri Timor Shah Rafiq v. Nautilus Tug & Towage Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal (supra) di atas, kini Mahkamah perlu meneliti adakah tindakan Plaintif adalah sesuatu yang jujur dan ikhlas. Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa tindakan pihak Plaintif adalah disebabkan kebimbangan Defendan Pertama sebagai pemilik saham Pink Zone Sdn Bhd dan Swan Yik Enterprise telah membenarkan Swan Yik Enterprise tidak membuat pembayaran kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd yang sepatutnya dibayar oleh Swan Yik Enterprise.

26. Mahkamah ini mendapati asas kepada dakwaan Plaintif adalah terdapatnya dokumen-dokumen yang menunjukkan penjualan kayukayu yang diperolehi daripada kawasan konsensi pembalakan di Hutan Simpan Balok, Mukim Sungai Karang. Selain daripada dokumen-dokumen tersebut, Mahkamah mendapati tiada sebarang keterangan lain yang menyokong dakwaan Plaintif dalam kes ini.

27. Ini ditambah pula dengan penyata-penyata akaun yang melibatkan Pink Zone Sdn Bhd yang telah juga ditandatangani oleh Plaintif. Namun Plaintif dalam affidavit balasannya telah menyanggah fakta tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan penyata akaun tersebut adalah merupakan draf sahaja berdasarkan kepada pernyataan yang diperolehi pada masa itu. Draf penyata akaun itu tidak ditandatangani dan tidak diaudit menunjukkan bahawa ia adalah draf sahaja. Oleh itu tidak timbul isu berkenaan dengan pembayaran cukai kepada keuntungan tersebut kerana ianya masih tertakluk kepada ianya dimuktamadkan.

28. Penelitian Mahkamah kepada affidavit sokongan, affidavit jawapan dan affidavit balasan pihak-pihak dalam kes ini telah menyebabkan Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Plaintif semasa membuat permohonan kebenaran ini tidak menunjukkan bahawa terdapatnya asas kepada bayaran yang perlu dibayar oleh Swan Yik Enterprise kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd dan mempunyai maklumat bahawa terdapat akaunakaun syarikat Pink Zone Sdn Bhd yang masih tidak dimuktamadkan. Persoalannya bagaimana dengan ketiadaan akaun yang telah dimuktamadkan itu Plaintif boleh dikatakan mempunyai keikhlasan untuk membuat permohonan tindakan terbitan ini bagi menjaga kepentingan syarikat.

29. Pada masa yang sama semasa mengemukakan affidavit sokongan permohonan ini tidak diperjelaskan berkenaan dengan kedudukan sebenar pembelian saham Pink Zone Sdn Bhd dan pembayaran saham-saham tersebut. la hanya timbul setelah dibangkitkan oleh Defendan semasa affidavit jawapan. Mahkamah juga mendapati penjelasan yang diberikan oleh Plaintif dalam affidavit balasan tidak dapat merungkaikan keterangan berkenaan dengan kedudukan syarikat Swan Yik Enterprise dan kepentingan Defendan Pertama dan Plaintif di dalam syarikat Pink Zone Sdn Bhd. Ini pada hemat Mahkamah tidak konsisten dengan keikhlasan Plaintif membuat permohonan kebenaran untuk prosiding tindakan terbitan.

30. Seterusnya Mahkamah ini juga perlu menimbangkan permohonan ini adalah untuk kepentingan syarikat. Adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa permohonan ini dibuat ialah untuk memastikan Swan Yik Enterprise membuat pembayaran kepada syarikat Pink Zone Sdn Bhd. Namun begitu disebabkan tiada sebarang pengesahan berkenaan dengan berapakah jumlah bayaran yang perlu dibayar oleh Swan Yik Enterprise kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif berdasarkan kepada hanya penyata-penyata penjualan yang tidak dapat disahkan, Mahkamah ini berpendapat tidak dapat ditunjukkan bahawa Plaintif membuat permohonan ini untuk menjaga kepentingan syarikat. Ini adalah disebabkan tiada sebarang keterangan yang dapat menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa amaun tersebut adalah amaun yang perlu dibayar oleh Swan Yik Enterprise kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd. Pada hemat Mahkamah ia hanya merupakah satu jumlah yang masih belum disahkan. Apa yang jelas tindakan Plaintif hanyalah berdasarkan kepada jumlah yang pada pandangan Plaintif perlu dijelaskan oleh Swan Yik Enterprise kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd.

31. Persoalannya ialah adakah ia memadai untuk menunjukkan bahawa tindakan Plaintif ini adalah demikian kepentingan syarikat. Mahkamah mendapati ia tidak dapat ditunjukkan sebagai untuk kepentingan syarikat. Ini adalah disebabkan sekiranya Swan Yik Enterprise tidak membayar amaun yang dikatakan perlu dibayar kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd ia juga akan menjejaskan Defendan Pertama yang merupakan salah seorang pemegang saham kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd.

32. Mahkamah ini tidak juga melupakan bahawa Defendan Pertama juga adalah berkepentingan di dalam Swan Yik Enterprise. Ini bermakna bahawa sebarang tindakan Swan Yik Enterprise yang tidak membayar kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd akan menjejaskan Defendan Pertama juga. Malahan ia akan menjejaskan Pink Zone Sdn Bhd itu sendiri.

33. Namun disebabkan tiada pengesahan jumlah hutang yang sepatutnya dibayar oleh Swan Yik Enterprise kepada Pink Zone Sdn Bhd maka sukar untuk Mahkamah ini menerima hujahan bahawa permohonan ini dibuat untuk kepentingan syarikat. Ia disebabkan kepentingan itu masih belum dapat ditunjukkan oleh Plaintif dalam permohonan melainkan bersandarkan kepada dokumen-dokumen penjualan kayukayu yang masih belum dapat disahkan oleh Swan Yik Enterprise dan Pink Zone Sdn Bhd.

34. Berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan di atas Mahkamah berpendapat permohonan Plaintif ditolak dengan kos.

Bertarikh : 11 OGOS 2025

(ROSLAN MAT NOR) HAKIM

Kaunsel:

Bagi pihak plaintif – C M Lai & Mou Kar Wye; T/n CM Lai & Partners Kuala Lumpur

Bagi pihak defendan-defendan – Jeane Lee Yi Jin & Yeap Xi Jin; T/n Lim Kian Leong & Co

SITRAC CORPORATION SDN BHD & ANOR v. DATO’ SYED HAMZAH SYED ABU BAKAR (DECEASED; REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED) & ORSHIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPURLIZA CHAN SOW KENG JC[CIVIL SUIT NO: WA-22NCC-623-11-2019]14 AUGUST 2022

Robin
Abstract – There is no exact science in the assessment of general damages. The expenditure on legal bills in instructing solicitors and engaging counsel are actual damages and comes under the umbrella of general damages.


DAMAGES: Assessment – Legal bills – Claimants’ legal bills in appointing solicitors and/or counsel – Whether legal fees incurred actual damages that were reasonably foreseeable – Reasonable sum for distress, inconvenience and hardship suffered by claimants
Owing to the non-compliance of a discovery order, an unless order in terms was made against the first defendant’s representative. The disobedience order of the unless order resulted in judgment being entered against the first defendant in terms as per the following: (i) that the High Court order was declared to have been obtained by fraud and/or dishonesty by the first defendant; (ii) that the High Court order obtained by the first defendant was impeached and set aside in totality and the originating summons (‘OS’) was struck off and/or set aside in totality; (iii) the first defendant’s action of filing the OS amounted to an abuse of process and be struck off and/or set aside; (iv) general damages to be assessed against the first defendant; and (v) costs and interest. Hence, the present application by the plaintiffs for assessment of damages. In support of the application, the plaintiff submitted that (i) in relation to having to file the present suit, the plaintiffs incurred legal bills fully-settled by the plaintiffs in appointing solicitors and/or counsel, totalling up to RM300,477.73; (ii) following the conduct of the first defendant, legal action would have to be taken by the plaintiffs against the first defendant; therefore, legal fees incurred by the plaintiffs were actual damages that were reasonably foreseeable; and (iii) damages of RM50,000 was a reasonable sum for distress, inconvenience and hardship suffered by the plaintiffs in defending and/or protecting the shares of the second plaintiff in the first plaintiff, which shares the first defendant sought to unilaterally transfer by practising deception on the court and the second defendant through deliberate and conscious concealment of evidence relevant and material in regard to the OS without the knowledge of the plaintiffs.Held (assessing total damages for legal bills and for hardship and inconvenience at RM225,477.73 with costs of assessment fixed at RM5,000):(1) The plaintiffs’ legal fees, amounting to RM300,477.73, was the actual damages suffered. The plaintiff had to incur the fees to protect their interests in the shares. The expenditure on legal bills by the plaintiffs, in instructing solicitors and engaging counsel to defend and/or protect the second plaintiff’s shares in the first plaintiff were clearly actual damages caused directly by the first defendant’s wrongs and came under the umbrella of general damages. In any case, these legal costs could not have been pleaded as special damages as the present proceedings were on-going. Causation was established; but for the first defendant’s fraud and/or dishonesty in obtaining the High Court order, these present proceedings would not have been rendered necessary and legal bills would not have to be incurred. (paras 28-30)(2) Legal bills totalling RM300,477.73 was not unreasonable at all. The court, in the exercise of discretion, (i) allowed the sum of RM220,477.73; and (ii) awarded only nominal damages of RM5,000 for hardship and inconvenience. (paras 32 & 38)
Case(s) referred to:Bekalan Sains P & C Sdn Bhd v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2011] CLJU 232; [2011] 1 LNS 232 CA (refd)Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Limited [1948] 64 TLR 177 (refd)Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v. Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 1 CLJ 19 HC (refd)Cheong Fatt Tze Mansion Sdn Bhd v. Hotel Continental Sdn Bhd; Hong Hing Thai Enterprise Sdn Bhd (Third Party) [2010] CLJU 980; [2010] 1 LNS 980 HC (refd)Doyle v. Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 119 (refd)Hock Huat Iron Foundry v. Naga Tembaga Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 89 CA (refd)Johandra Realty Sdn Bhd & Satu Lagi lwn. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pengairan Dan Saliran Malaysia & Satu Lagi [2021]
       2 CLJ 485 CA (refd)Kuan Pek Seng v. Robert Doran & Ors And Other Appeals [2012] CLJU 775; [2012] 1 LNS 775 CA (refd)Lau Yang Kim v. Rescom Australia Sdn Bhd & Anor [2020] 4 CLJ 130 HC (refd)Ling Peek Hoe & Anor v. Ding Siew Ching & Ors And Another Case [2022] 7 CLJ 412 HC (refd)Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Company (1880) 5 App Cas 25 (refd)MD Biomedical Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Goh Yong Khai [2021] 6 CLJ 30 CA (refd)Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 609 CA (refd)Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 CLJ 198; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 300 FC (refd)Pang Yeow Chow v. Advance Specialist Treatment Engineering Sdn Bhd [2014] 8 CLJ 188 CA (refd)Popular Industries Ltd. v. The Eastern Garment Manufacturing Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 133; [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 635 HC (refd)Professor Emeritus Dr Azman Awang & Anor v. FSBM CTech Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] CLJU 1731; [2021] 1 LNS 1731 (dist)Rajamani Meyappa Chettiar v. Eng Beng Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] CLJU 2233; [2021] 1 LNS 2233 HC (refd)Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v. Steen Consultants Pte Ltd and Another [2008] SGCA 8 (refd)Sambaga Valli K R Ponnusamy v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors And Another Appeal [2017] CLJU 500; [2017] 1 LNS 500 CA (refd)Shen & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Jutawarna Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 8 CLJ 125 HC (refd)Sim Thong Realty Sdn Bhd v. Teh Kim Dar [2003] 3 CLJ 227 CA (refd)Sitrac Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato’ Syed Hamzah Syed Abu Bakar (Deceased) & Ors [2021] CLJU 1740; [2021]
       1 LNS 1740 HC (refd)Sitrac Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato’ Syed Hamzah Syed Abu Bakar (Deceased) & Ors [2022] 2 CLJ 641 HC (refd)Smith New Court Securities Ltd v. Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 769 (refd)Sonic Finance Inc & Anor v. Halim Mohammad & Ors [2019] CLJU 651; [2019] 1 LNS 651 HC (refd)Sony Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v. Direct Interest Sdn Bhd [2007] 1 CLJ 611 CA (refd)Uda Holdings Bhd v. Koperasi Pasaraya Malaysia Bhd & Other Appeals [2007] 5 CLJ 489 CA (refd)Wembley Gypsum Products Sdn Bhd v. MST Industrial Systems Sdn Bhd [2007] 6 CLJ 228 CA (refd)Yap Boon Hwa v. Kee Wah Soong [2019] CLJU 1157; [2019] 1 LNS 1157 CA (refd)
Counsel:For the plaintiff – Lim Kian Leong & Jessica Chong; M/s Lim Kian Leong & CoFor the 1st defendant – Simrenjeet Singh & Ng Tat Sun; M/s Simrenjeet, Tay & CoFor the 2nd defendant – Zuriatul Mida & Nor Syairah; Companies Commission of MalaysiaFor the 3rd defendant – Nik Asilah; M/s Zahir Jeya & Zainal
Reported by Najib Tamby
JUDGMENTLiza Chan Sow Keng JC:Introduction[1] Pursuant to the plaintiffs’ application in enclosure (“encl.”) 203, I had assessed damages at sum of RM225,477.73. These are the reasons for my decision.Background[2] Owing to the non-compliance of the discovery order made on 25 August 2021, an “unless order’ in the terms as contained in encl. 176 was made on 21 September 2021 against the first defendant’s representative to be complied with by 30 September 2021. The disobedience of the “unless order “resulted in judgment being entered on 18 October 2021 against the first defendant on terms as follows:(i) that the order obtained on 21 May 2019 by the first defendant in Kuala Lumpur High Court Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-134-03-2019 is declared to have been obtained by fraud and/or dishonesty by the first defendant;(ii) that the order obtained on 21 May 2019 by the first defendant in Kuala Lumpur High Court Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-131-03-2019 is impeached and set aside in totality and High Court Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC131-03-2019 is struck off and/or set aside in totality;(iii) the first defendant’s action of filing the High Court Originating Summons No. WA24NCC-131-03-2019 amounts to an abuse of process and struck off and/or set aside;(iv) general damages to be assessed against the first defendant;(v) interest to accrue at the rate of 5% per annum on such damages as may be assessed and awarded by this Honourable Court from the date of judgment till the date of full and final settlement of the same;(vi) first defendant to pay costs of RM75,000 to the plaintiffs subject to allocator;(vii) first defendant to pay costs of RM30,000 to D2 subject to allocator; and(viii) first defendant to pay costs of RM40,000 to D3 subject to allocator.[3] The reasons for allowing the discovery application, the background leading to the filing of this suit, the nature of the plaintiffs’ suit have been set out in my first grounds of judgment – see Sitrac Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato’ Syed Hamzah Syed Abu Bakar (Deceased) & Ors [2021] CLJU 1740; [2021] 1 LNS 1740; [2022] 8 MLJ 43. The reasons for making the ‘unless order’, its non-adherence leading to judgment being entered against the first defendant were set out in Sitrac Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato’ Syed Hamzah Syed Abu Bakar (Deceased) & Ors [2022] 2 CLJ 641; [2022] 10 MLJ 900.[4] The first defendant has since appealed against the decision of this court in making the order for discovery, the ‘unless order’ and judgment entered on 18 October 2021. These three appeals were pending hearing before the Court of Appeal when the plaintiffs filed encl. 203 on 11 November 2021 for assessment of damages pursuant to the judgment dated 18 October 2021.[5] The parties agreed that assessment would proceed by way of affidavits.[6] As the first defendant’s solicitors have discharged themselves pending hearing of encl. 203, the first defendant was granted an extension of time during case management on 12 January 2022 to file his affidavit in reply to the assessment of damages by end February 2022 but did not do so. Instead on 29 March 2022, the first defendant filed two applications respectively for extension of time to file an affidavit in reply and to stay the assessment of damages pending hearing of the above appeals. The assessment of damages was derailed pending the hearing of these two applications. Both applications were subsequently dismissed as this court found there were no material before the court that constituted cogent reasons warranting the exercise of discretion by the court in the first defendant’s favour, whether for extension of time or for a stay of the assessment of damages.The Parties’ Arguments[7] It was submitted by the plaintiffs that upon discovery of the first defendant’s actions and attempts to unilaterally transfer the shares of the second plaintiff in the first plaintiff by way of rectification of the first plaintiff’s register through the court and the second defendant, the plaintiffs had hastily sought the service of solicitors and submitted an objection to the second defendant and filed the present suit against the first defendant to impugn the court order dated 21 May 2019 (“the impugned court order”) obtained by the first defendant in Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-131-03-2019 (“OS 131”) and to strike out and/or set aside OS 131 in its entirety on the ground that the first defendant has practised deception on the court through deliberate and conscious concealment of evidence relevant and material in OS 131 in obtaining the impugned court order. The first defendant had filed two appeals against the ‘unless order’ and judgment respectively both dated 18 October 2021.[8] It was averred in the plaintiffs’ affidavit affirmed on 11 January 2022 that in relation to having to file the present suit, the plaintiffs incurred legal bills fully settled by the plaintiffs in appointing solicitors and/or counsel, totalling up to RM300,477.73 (RM318,701.52 – RM18,223.79 (the legal bill on a separate file but related to this suit)) which was paid for by the plaintiffs. It was further averred that the cost of RM300,477.73, incurred on the legal bills should less out the cost of RM5,000 awarded in the order dated 26 June 2019, and the cost of RM75,000 awarded in the judgment dated 18 October 2021 giving a sum of RM220,477.73. It was submitted that following the conduct of the first defendant, legal action would have to be taken by the plaintiffs against the first defendant, thus legal fees incurred by the plaintiffs are actual damages that are reasonably foreseeable citing in support:(i) MD Biomedical Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Goh Yong Khai [2021] 6 CLJ 30; [2021] 5 MLJ 408 where the Court of Appeal stated:The court agreed with the principles laid down in Lo Foi v. Lee Ah Hong @ Lee Lum Sow & Ors [1997] MLJU 310 and found that the appellant’s sole claim for ‘total legal fees and disbursements of RM70,000’ came within the meaning of ‘the tortious damage’ and the ‘foreseeability test’ and that the claim for the legal fees was not too remote…The learned justices were of the view that the appellant’s payment of legal fees amounting to RM70,000 was ‘actual damage’ suffered.(ii) Yap Boon Hwa v. Kee Wah Soong [2019] CLJU 1157; [2019] 1 LNS 1157; [2020] 1 MLJ 37:The defendant is the shareholder of 99,999 shares in Premier Property Sdn Bhd whilst his wife owns one share. The learned High Court Judge was of the view that the defendant owns and is the directing mind and will of Premier Property Sdn Bhd. The learned High Court Judge rejected the argument by the second plaintiff that, as the legal fees was paid by Premier Property Sdn Bhd, the defendant did not suffer loss. The legal fees paid by Premier Property Sdn Bhd to the defendant’s solicitors must have been paid at the behest and directive of the defendant. Having to defend the suit, to pursue the counterclaim, to prove the fraudulent misrepresentation of the second plaintiff and in bringing witnesses for the trial had resulted in the defendant having to incur legal expenses and fees. Hence such expenses are reasonable and recoverable.(iii) Rajamani Meyappa Chettiar v. Eng Beng Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] CLJU 2233; [2021] 1 LNS 2233; [2021] MLJU 2648 where legal fees and costs over and above the party-to-party costs were allowed as damages.[9] Apart from legal costs, it was averred that, damages of RM50,000 is a reasonable sum for distress, inconvenience and hardship suffered by the plaintiffs in defending and/or protecting the shares of the second plaintiff in the first plaintiff, which shares the first defendant sought to unilaterally transfer by practising deception on the court and second defendant through deliberate and conscious concealment of evidence relevant and material in regard to OS 131 without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs only came to know of the first defendant’s actions after the impugned court order was served on them. The issues raised by the first defendant in OS 131 surrounding the second plaintiff’s shares in the first plaintiff have been raised several other times before in different situations:(i) the first time in 1992 in the High Court Suit No. D2-22-1507-1992. The case was dismissed after a full trial, decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and up to the leave to appeal stage in the Federal Court;(ii) the first defendant had also made police reports against Syed Mustaffa bin Syed Abdullah Shahabuddin in relation to the same shares;(iii) a similar complaint, as in the rectification, was made to the second defendant on 17 August 2006 which was investigated by the second defendant and subsequently dismissed due to insufficient evidence on the part of the first defendant.[10] In contesting the claim under the two heads of damages, the first defendant on the other hand contended that:(i) the legal bills are special damages which must be strictly pleaded and established by the claimant – Shen & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Jutawarna Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 8 CLJ 125; [2016] 7 MLJ 183; Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 CLJ 198; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 300; [1983] 2 MLJ 324 FC. Specifically, in Lau Yang Kim v. Rescom Australia Sdn Bhd & Anor [2020] 4 CLJ 130; [2020] MLJU 105, Amarjeet Singh JC held:[26] In my view, legal fees fall within the meaning of special damages. I reach this conclusion after applying the test stated in Ong Ah Long (supra). I find that legal fees are ascertained expenses and therefore particularity is necessary to warn the defendant of what is being claimed or the claims that he will be confronted with at the trial.[27] However in the present case the legal fees could not be pleaded and proved at the trial because the legal fees have yet to crystallise. To be entitled to an award of special damages the items constituting special damages must have been expended before the trial begins. In the present case the dates of the twelve invoices that make up the legal fees range from 15 June 2015 until 13 August 2018 and the payment in respect of the twelfth invoice was only made on 15 October 2018 after the trial of this action was concluded. Therefore, the legal fees of a concluded action cannot be claimed in the same action as special damages.(ii) legal fees cannot qualify as damages; instead, they are costs incurred by the plaintiffs in defending themselves in the proceedings. Even if the plaintiffs tried to argue that the fees are special damages, the fees have not been pleaded by the plaintiffs, and the judgment dated 18 October 2021 did not provide for costs on an indemnity basis. To allow the claim for legal fees would mean allowing a claim for costs on an indemnity – Professor Emeritus Dr Azman Awang & Anor v. FSBM CTech Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] CLJU 1731; [2021] 1 LNS 1731; [2021] MLJU 2227;(iii) the plaintiffs have not discharged their burden of proof as merely invoices of Messrs Lim Kian Leong & Co were produced;(iv) in the event of finding of liability to make payment towards the legal bills, this court ought to make deductions in respect of the legal costs previously awarded so that there is no double recovery – Ling Peek Hoe & Anor v. Ding Siew Ching & Ors And Another Case [2022] 7 CLJ 412; [2022] MLJU 157; Sonic Finance Inc & Anor v. Halim Mohammad & Ors [2019] CLJU 651; [2019] 1 LNS 651; [2019] MLJU 1887.[11] As for the claim for distress, inconvenience and hardship caused by the first defendant, there was no evidence to support this claim – Sambaga Valli K R Ponnusamy v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors And Another Appeal [2017] CLJU 500; [2017] 1 LNS 500; [2018] 1 MLJ 784.Legal Principles On Assessment Of Damages[12] The High Court in Cheong Fatt Tze Mansion Sdn Bhd v. Hotel Continental Sdn Bhd; Hong Hing Thai Enterprise Sdn Bhd (Third Party) [2010] CLJU 980; [2010] 1 LNS 980; [2011] 4 MLJ 354 at p. 378, explained the law on the difference between general damages:In Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edn Reissue para 812, the distinction between ‘general’ and ‘special’ damages is well illustrated as follows:A distinction is frequently drawn between the terms ‘general’ and ‘special’ damages, which terms have different meanings according to the context in which they are used. In the context of liability for loss (usually in contract), general damages are those which arise naturally and in the normal course of events, whereas special damages are those which do not arise naturally out of the defendant’s breach and are recoverable only where they were not beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties (for example, where the plaintiff communicated to the defendant prior to the breach the likely consequences of the breach). The distinction between the two terms is also drawn in relation to proof of loss; here, general damages are those losses, usually but not exclusively non-pecuniary, which are not capable of precise quantification in monetary terms, whereas special damages, in this context, are those losses which can be calculated in financial terms. A third distinction between the two terms is in relation to pleading: here, special damage refers to those losses which must be proved, whereas general damages are those which will be presumed to be the natural or probable consequence of the wrong complained of, with the result that the plaintiff is required only to assert that such damage has been suffered.[13] In short general damages:(i) arise naturally and in the normal course of events;(ii) are not capable of precise quantification in monetary terms; and(iii) are presumed to be the natural or probable consequence of the wrong complained of.[14] The purpose of awarding damages is to give the claimant compensation for the damage, loss or injury that he has suffered. At least three Court of Appeal cases in Uda Holdings Bhd v. Koperasi Pasaraya Malaysia Bhd & Other Appeals [2007] 5 CLJ 489; [2007] 6 MLJ 530, Johandra Realty Sdn Bhd & Satu Lagi lwn. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pengairan Dan Saliran Malaysia & Satu Lagi [2021] 2 CLJ 485; [2021] 2 MLJ 738 and Wembley Gypsum Products Sdn Bhd v. MST Industrial Systems Sdn Bhd [2007] 6 CLJ 228; [2007] 7 MLJ 193 cited the oft-quoted words of Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Company (1880) 5 App Cas 25 (HL) at p. 39:… that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation.[15] The burden of proof is on the party seeking damages to prove the fact of damage and the amount of damages (Hock Huat Iron Foundry v. Naga Tembaga Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 89; [1999] 1 MLJ 65 (CA); Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Limited [1948] 64 TLR 177; Popular Industries Ltd v. The Eastern Garment Manufacturing Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 133; [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 635; [1989] 3 MLJ 360 and Sony Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v. Direct Interest Sdn Bhd [2007] 1 CLJ 611; [2007] 2 MLJ 229 (CA). If the claimant fails to satisfy the court on the fact of damage and quantum, then his claim for damages must fail or he would be awarded nominal damages where his right has been infringed.[16] Where precise evidence is obtainable, the court naturally expects to have it, where it is not, the court must do the best it can – Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v. Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 1 CLJ 19; [1993] 3 MLJ 352.[17] There must be a causal connection between the wrong and the loss. Causation was stressed in Popular Industries Ltd (supra):A word now about general principles. When a plaintiff claims damages from a defendant, he has to show that the loss in respect of which he claims damages was caused by the defendant’s wrong, and also that the damages are not too remote to be recoverable.Damages – Proving It[18] The process of proving damage is intensely factual and the plaintiff could not simply make a claim for damages without placing before the court sufficient evidence of the loss it had suffered even if it was otherwise entitled in principle to recover damages – Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v. Steen Consultants Pte Ltd and Another [2008] SGCA 8[19] The principles that emerge from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Sony ‘s case on proving loss or damages are instructive:(i) the plaintiff must produce all necessary supporting documents. In Sony ‘s case the plaintiff failed to produce the documents to support the audited statements of account. This proved to be fatal;(ii) the plaintiff must lead evidence on the computation or breakdown of the loss. The plaintiff failed to do so in Sony;(iii) the causal connection must also be shown. In Sony ‘s case, the plaintiff failed to prove the contents of the reduction in the volume of services and how this related to the alleged breach of the agreement;(iv) a summary of particulars or sheet of calculations or summary of accounts do not prove the contents. They are nothing more than conclusions. They must be proven by calling the maker to explain the facts and basis of calculation. In addition, the books to support the calculation must be in evidence.[20]Sony was cited in another Court of Appeal decision. In Bekalan Sains P & C Sdn Bhd v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2011] CLJU 232; [2011] 1 LNS 232; [2011] 5 MLJ 1, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal for, amongst others, these reasons:(i) failure to provide precise evidence on damages;(ii) failure to lead evidence of actual loss;(iii) no substantiation of figures;(iv) “plucking figures out of the air”;(v) self-serving statements by the appellant’s own officers without calling independent witnesses;(vi) claims for losses not suffered by the appellant for charged lands. The charged lands did not belong to the appellant. It belonged to PW2 but the appellant was claiming damages for the sale of the charged land;(vii) appellant’s failure to mitigate its loss.[21] Some passages from the judgment merits production:[189] The person who is claiming damages must prove his case. Thus, the claimant in order to justify an award of substantial damages he must satisfy the court as to the fact of damage and as to its quantum (Senate Electrical Wholesalers Ltd v. Alcatel Submarine Networks Ltd (Formerly STC Submarine Systems Ltd) [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 423 (CA)). If the claimant fails to satisfy the court on the fact of damage and quantum, then his action must fail or at the very least he would be awarded nominal damages where his right has been infringed.[190] Put in another way, the claimant must show actual loss and evidence must be led in that direction. It is submitted that the appellant has failed to prove damages with precise evidence (Sony Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v. Direct Interest Sdn Bhd [2007] 1 CLJ 611; [2007] 2 MLJ 229, (CA); and Ban Chuan Trading Co Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Ng Bak Guan [2003] 4 CLJ 785; [2004] 1 MLJ 411, (CA)) and that the appellant has also failed to lead evidence to show actual loss.(emphasis added)Decision[22] I deal first with the claim for legal bills.[23] Besides bearing the above principles in mind, it must not be forgotten that the order obtained on 21 May 2019 by the first defendant in Kuala Lumpur High Court Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-134-03-2019 was declared to have been obtained by fraud and/or dishonesty by the first defendant.[24] Lord Denning MR in the English Court of Appeal case of Doyle v. Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 119 said:In fraud, the defendant has been guilty of a deliberate wrong by inducing the plaintiff to act to his detriment. The object of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for all the loss he has suffered, so far, again, as money can do it. In contract, the damages are limited to what may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties. In fraud, they are not so limited. The defendant is bound to make reparation for all the actual damage directly flowing from the fraudulent inducement. The person who has been defrauded is entitled to say:I would not have entered into this bargain at all but for your representation. Owing to your fraud, I have not only lost all the money I paid you, but, what is more, I have been put to a large amount of extra expense as well and suffered this or that extra damages.All such damages can be recovered: and it does not lie in the mouth of the fraudulent person to say that they could not reasonably have been foreseen. For instance, in this very case the plaintiff has not only lost the money which he paid for the business, which he would never have done if there had been no fraud: he put all that money in and lost it; but also, he has been put to expense and loss in trying to run a business which has turned out to be a disaster for him. He is entitled to damages for all his loss, subject, of course, to giving credit for any benefit that he has received. There is nothing to be taken off in mitigation: for there is nothing more that he could have done to reduce his loss. He did all that he could reasonably be expected to do.(emphasis added)[25] The law stated in Doyle v. Olby was approved by the House of Lords in Smith New Court Securities Ltd v. Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 769 where Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that:… the primary rule was that a victim of fraud was entitled to compensation for all the actual loss, including consequential loss, directly flowing from the transaction induced by the deceit of the wrongdoer and damages is not limited to those that are reasonably foreseeable…. The assessment of damages would therefore include all expenditure incurred reasonably and properly in consequence of and flowing directly from the deceit or fraud.[26] Examples of Malaysian cases that followed the dictum in Doyle v. Olby are Sim Thong Realty Sdn Bhd v. Teh Kim Dar [2003] 3 CLJ 227; [2003] 3 MLJ 460 (CA), Kuan Pek Seng v. Robert Doran & Ors And Other Appeals [2012] CLJU 775; [2012] 1 LNS 775; [2013] 2 MLJ 174, Yap Boon Hwa v. Kee Wah Soong [2019] CLJU 1157; [2019] 1 LNS 1157; [2020] 1 MLJ 37. In the latter, the Court of Appeal said:[63] In a claim for damages, we are guided by Doyle v. Olby where the court had stated that ‘… He is entitled to damages for all his loss, subject, of course to giving credit for any benefit that he has received…[27] The Court of Appeal allowed legal fees in Yap Boon Hwa v. Kee Wah Soong (supra) at [77] and [79].[28] In this case, the plaintiffs’ legal fees amounting to RM300,477.73 is the actual damages they suffered. The plaintiff had to incur the fees to protect their interests in the shares.[29] Quite apart from Yap Boon Hwa v. Kee Wah Soong, I find there is merit in the plaintiff’s submission that another two cases of the Court of Appeal namely Pang Yeow Chow v. Advance Specialist Treatment Engineering Sdn Bhd [2014] 8 CLJ 188; [2015] 1 MLJ 490 and MD Biomedical Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Goh Yong Khai made clear that legal bills are claimable as damages. I am in accord with the Court of Appeal’s view, for in the present case, the expenditure on legal bills by the plaintiffs in instructing solicitors and engaging counsel to defend and/or protect the second plaintiff’s shares in the first plaintiff are clearly actual damages caused directly by the first defendant’s wrongs and comes under the umbrella of general damages. In any case, these legal costs could not have been pleaded as special damages as these present proceedings were ongoing. Professor Emeritus Dr Azman Awang ‘s case is distinguishable on the basis that Her Ladyship Adlin Abdul Majid JC was not called upon to consider legal costs in an ongoing action such as the present which could not have been pleaded; the legal costs in that case were incurred for the past action and could have been pleaded.[30] I find causation was established – but for the first defendant’s fraud and/or dishonesty in obtaining the impugned court order in OS 131, these present proceedings would not have been rendered necessary, and legal bills would not have to be incurred.[31] Commendation, however, must be given to learned counsel for the plaintiffs, the late Mr Lim Kian Leong who in his usual frank and candid self- had from the outset of his submissions stated that the costs previously ordered (even though not paid) should be deducted from the legal bills. This as explained in Sonic Finance Inc (supra) at [34] is to avoid ‘double recovery’ in respect of the costs (by way of the previous orders granting costs and through this assessment).[32] What was left for consideration was the quantum of the legal bills. Given the late Mr Lim Kian Leong’s seniority and well recognised legal abilities, I do not find the legal bills totalling RM300,477.73 as being unreasonable at all. I will, in the exercise of discretion, allow the sum of RM220,477.73 (ie, RM300,477.73 less (i) RM5,000 awarded in the order dated 26 June 2019, and (ii) the cost of RM75,000 awarded in the judgment dated 18 October 2021) following Sonic Finance Inc.[33] As for the first defendant’s contention that receipts were not produced, I find there is a positive averment in para. 8 of the affidavit affirmed on 11 January 2022 by Mr Ngan Chin Woo that these bills have been paid. In fact, the whole affidavit stood unrebutted. In Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 609; [1995] 1 MLJ 281, it was held that: ‘In evaluating affidavit evidence, where one party makes a positive assertion upon a material issue, the failure of his opponent to contradict it is usually treated as an admission by him of the fact so asserted’.[34] Bearing in mind the words of Lord Goddard in Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Limited (1948) 64 TLR 177, this was not the case here where the plaintiffs simply wrote down the particulars of their damages and threw them to the court and demanded for it.[35] As for the amount of RM50,000 sought for distress, inconvenience and hardship caused by the first defendant to the plaintiffs, I have kept in mind:(i) that the law recognises corporate entities too can sue and recover for inconvenience, embarrassment and damage to reputation; and(ii) that there is no exact science in the assessment of general damages.[36]Sambaga Valli K R Ponnusamy v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors And Another Appeal [2017] CLJU 500; [2017] 1 LNS 500; [2018] 1 MLJ 784 for some unknown reason was submitted by the first defendant.[37] In Professor Emeritus Dr Azman Awang ‘s case, Her Ladyship Adlin Abdul Majid JC awarded RM200,000 in general damages for the hardship caused to the plaintiff in that case. However, here, there is inadequate substantiation of the sum sought. Thus, I exercise my discretion to award only nominal damages of RM5,000 for hardship and inconvenience which sum I think, is fair for the trouble the plaintiffs have been put through. I have considered that the matter which has its genesis in 1992, spanned almost 30 years, and the plaintiff’s representative, who has personal knowledge of the matter, is 84 years old. He had to testify at trial in open court at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, and he is also the deponent of the plaintiffs’ affidavits.[38] Total damages for legal bills, and for hardship and inconvenience as such is assessed at RM225,477.73 with costs of assessment fixed at RM5,000 subject to allocator.[2022] 1 LNS 1915

TAN POH HUI v. CAIRNHILL HOTEL (M) SDN BHDINDUSTRIAL COURT, KUALA LUMPUREDDIE YEO SOON CHYE;   EMPLOYEES’ PANEL: MOHD EFFENDY ABDUL GHANI;   EMPLOYERS’ PANEL: SARITA BERAM SHAH @ RAJARAMAWARD NO. 372 OF 2020 [CASE NO: 1/1-2236/19]12 FEBRUARY 2020

Robin

INDUSTRIAL COURT OF MALAYSIA
[CASE NO: 1/1-2236/19]

BETWEEN

TAN POH HUI

AND

CAIRNHILL HOTEL (M) SDN BHD
(Consolidated with Case No. 28(6)/4-1141/16 by Court Order vide Interim Award No. 1780 of 2017 dated 12 December 2017)

AWARD NO. 372 OF 2020

CORAM:Y. A. TUAN EDDIE YEO SOON CHYE – PRESIDENT
EN. MOHD. EFFENDY BIN ABDUL GHANI – EMPLOYEES’ PANEL
PN. SARITA A/P BERAM SHAH @ RAJARAM – EMPLOYERS’ PANEL
VENUE:Industrial Court Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur
FILING OF FORM S:14.11.2019
DATE OF MENTION:17.12.2019
DATE OF HEARING:10.02.2020
REPRESENTATION:For the Complainant’s – Terence KM Chan & Bryan Goh Tseng Fook; M/s Lim Kian Leong & CoFor the Complainant – absentFor the Respondent’s – Vinu Kamalananthan & Nicholas Wing Juan Fung; M/s Vinu & LopezFor the Respondent’s – present

AWARD

[1] The Complainant filed the Form S pursuant to s. 56 (1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 & Rule 24A of the Industrial Court Rules 1967 on 14 November 2019 in respect of a complaint of Non-Compliance in the matter of Award No. 1835 of 2019 dated 26 June 2019 in Industrial Court Case No. 28(6)/4-1138/16 (consolidated with Case No. 28(6)/4-1141/16 Tan Poh Hui v. Cairnhill Hotel (M) Sdn. Bhd. vide Interim Award No. 1780 of 2017 dated 12 December 2017) between Tan Poh Hui v. Cairnhill Hotel Sdn. Bhd.

[2] The two cases were registered separately as follows:

(a) 6/4-1138/16 Tan Poh Yee (1st Claimant)

(b) 6/4-1141/16 Tan Poh Hui (2nd Claimant)

[3] A complaint is hereby lodged by the 2nd Claimant that the provisions of the abovementioned Award in paragraph 30 have not been complied that the Respondent is to pay the Claimant a sum of RM377,600.00 through the 2nd Claimant’s solicitors Messrs Lim Kian Leong & Co. within 14 days from the date of the hereof (26 June 2019) for release to the 2nd Claimant after income tax clearance.

Statement of Case

[4] The Complainant (2nd Claimant) filed the Statement of Case on 17 December 2019 and according to the 2nd Claimant’s knowledge, the Respondent did not file a Judicial Review against the decision of the Award by the Industrial Court. By letter dated 3 July 2019 from Messrs Lim Kian Leong & Co. to Messrs J. Nee (solicitors for the Respondent) a copy of the Award was enclosed for payment of the award sum to be made.

[5] The Complainant contends that the Respondent’s refusal to comply with the Award amounts to a non-compliance with the Award. The Complainant prays that an order directing the Respondent to comply with the term of the Award.

Statement in Reply

[6] The Respondent filed the Statement in Reply on 5 February 2020. The Respondent contends that it had not deliberately failed to comply with the Award as they nor the previous solicitors Messrs J. Nee were not aware that the Award was handed down by the Industrial Court. The Respondent contends that the filing of the non-compliance complaint is pre mature and/or irregular as the Respondent was not aware of the contents of the Award. The Respondent pray that the Complainant case be dismissed.

Submissions of both parties

[7] The Complainant’s counsel sent the Award to the Respondent’s solicitors by fax (TPH2). According to the Complainant’s counsel, payment has not been made to the Complainant by the Respondent. The Respondent’s counsel referred to pp. 1 & 3 of the annexures in the Statement in Reply and submitted that the Award was not served on the Respondent’s former solicitors. The Notice of Mention as sent to the Respondent upon the filing of Form S by the Complainant. The issue is whether the non-compliance was correctly filed. However, the Respondent’s counsel inform Court that the Award is valid.

[8] Reference was made to paragraph 2.2 of the Statement in Reply. The Respondent was only aware that a non-compliance complaint was filed when a notice of mention was served on 11 December 2019. This case was fixed for mention on 17 December 2019 with the presence of Bryan Goh of Messrs Lim Kian Leong & Co. and the presence of the Respondent’s representative both Chen Whye Keat & Low Yi Voon.

Decision

[9] The Industrial Court in the case of Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Perkilangan Perusahaan Makanan v. Gold Coin Specialities Sdn. Bhd. [2017] 2 ILR 260 at p. 262 referred to a decision by the Supreme Court case of Holiday Inn, Kuala Lumpur v. National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers [1988] 1 CLJ 133 in relation the application of section 56 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 as follows:

“Now, section 56 is concerned with the enforcement in a summary manner of an award made by the Industrial Court or of a collective agreement which has been taken cognisance of by the court under section 17 after a complaint has been lodged as to its non-compliance. The non-compliance of a term of the award or collective agreement must exist as an antecedent fact before the Industrial Court can exercise its power contained in subsection (2) thereof. It is therefore, a condition precedent to the exercise of those powers that there should be in existence a breach or non-observance of a term of the award or collective agreement. There must be satisfactorily established by the complainant.”

[10] The Supreme Court decided in the case of Dragon & Phoenix Berhad v. Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Perusahaan Membuat Tekstil & Pakaian Pulau Pinang & Anor. [1990] 2 ILR 515 at p. 616 as follows:

“In a complaint of non-compliance with any term of a collective agreement or award under section 56 of the Industrial Court should, as a general rule, look at the terms of the contract by confining itself to within the four walls of the collective agreement or award and decide whether the term has or has not been complied with. It is purely enforcement function.”

[11] The Court in handing down the Award is unanimous in its decision having taken into account the submissions by both parties. In arriving at this decision, the Court has acted with equity and good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to the technicalities and legal form as stated under section 30 (5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967.

[12] Pursuant to the powers of the Court under section 56 (2) (a) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and upon receipt of the complaint, the Court hereby makes an order directing the Respondent to comply with the award. In section 56 (3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, any person who fails to comply with an order of the Court under subsection (2) shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding RM2,000.00 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both, and a further fine of RM500.00 for every day during such offence continues.

[13] The order of the Court shall be in Form T. Rule 24 A (2) of the Industrial Court Rules 1967 reads as follows:

“When the Court makes an order of non-compliance against any party and such order has not been complied with, the Registrar of the Court may, at the request of either party, send a certified copy of the order to the Senior Assistant Registrar of the High Court or the Registrar of the Sessions Court, as the case may be, and the said Senior Assistant Registrar or the Registrar shall cause a copy of such order to be recorded and thereafter the said order shall, for all purposes, be enforceable as a judgement of the High Court or the Sessions Court in accordance with the Rules of the High Court or the Sessions Court.”

[14] The order of compliance is hereby allowed. The Court unanimously orders the Respondent to pay the Complainant the sum of RM377,600.00 forthwith.

HANDED DOWN AND DATED THIS 12TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2020

(EDDIE YEO SOON CHYE)
PRESIDENT
INDUSTRIAL COURT MALAYSIA[2020] 2 LNS 0372

Celcom (Malaysia) Bhd & Anor v Tan Sri Dato’ Tajudin bin Ramli & Ors and another case [2023] MLJU 1369

Robin

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)
WONG KIAN KHEONG J
SUIT NO D5-22-610 OF 2006 AND D1-22-1960 OF 2008
20 June 2023

JUDGMENT

(3 applications)A. Background

[1]  In the above two suits (2 Suits) –

  • (1)Civil Suit No. D5-22-610-2006 (1st Suit) has been filed by two plaintiff companies (Plaintiffs) against individual defendants on the ground that they had breached their fiduciary and statutory duties as directors of the Plaintiffs in respect of certain contracts and transactions entered into by the Plaintiffs;
  • (2)the Plaintiffs alleged in Civil Suit No. D1-22-1960-2008 (2nd Suit) that the seven defendants in the 2nd Suit had conspired, either by lawful or unlawful means, to injure the Plaintiffs and had thereby caused loss to the Plaintiffs; and
  • (3)Tan Sri Dato’ Tajudin bin Ramli (1st Defendant) and Dato’ Bistamam bin Ramli (2nd Defendant) are the first and second defendants in the 2 Suits. The 1st and 2nd Defendants (referred collectively in this judgment as the “Defendants”) have filed 2 counterclaims in the 2 Suits (2 Counterclaims) against the Plaintiffs and Telekom Malaysia Bhd. (TMB).

[2]  The following learned lead counsel appear in the 2 Suits and 2 Counterclaims (2 Suits/2 Counterclaims):

  • (1)Mr. Rabindra Nathan (Mr. Rabindra) is the learned lead counsel for the Plaintiffs;
  • (2)Mr. Lim Kian Leong led the Defendants in the 2 Suits/2 Counterclaims;
  • (3)there were certain German individuals and a German company who were defendants in the 2 Suits (collectively referred to in this judgment as the “German Entities”). The learned lead counsel for the German Entities is Mr. Christopher Leong Sau Foo (Mr. Leong). Mr. Leong is assisted by, among others, Mr. Lim Tuck Sun; and
  • (4)TMB’s learned lead counsel is Mr. Lambert Rasa-Ratnam (Mr. Rasa-Ratnam).

[3]  On 27.9.2021, the German Entities had called Mr. Thomas Ach to testify online in the joint trial of the 2 Suits/2 Counterclaims (Mr. Ach’s Online Testimony).

[4]  The 2 Suits were discontinued on 19.11.2021 by the Plaintiffs against the German Entities without any liberty to file afresh and with no order as to costs [Discontinuance Order (German Entities)].

[5]  On 21.1.2022, the Plaintiffs’ solicitors informed the court about a doctored video clip regarding Mr. Ach’s Online Testimony (Doctored Video Clip) which had been circulated in the public.

[6]  This court has delivered a judgment regarding the Doctored Video Clip – please refer to [2022] 3 MLRH 217, [2022] 4 CLJ 381, [2022] 3 AMR 486 [Judgment (Doctored Video Clip)].B. Three applications by Mr. Lim Tuck Sun

[7]  Initially, Mr. Lim Tuck Sun filed a notice of application (1st NA) which applied for the following orders:

  • (1)leave of court for Mr. Lim Tuck Sun to intervene in the 2 Suits/2 Counterclaims (Intervention Application); and
  • (2)parts of the Judgment (Doctored Video Clip) regarding Mr. Lim as stated in Appendix 1 to the 1st NA [Impugned Parts (Judgment)] should be expunged by the court (Expunction Application).

[8]  In the first case management (CM) of the 1st NA (1st CM) –

  • (1)Mr. Kenneth Koh Zhong Wey represented Mr. Lim Tuck Sun;
  • (2)the Plaintiffs, Defendants and TM were represented by learned counsel but the German Entities were not represented;
  • (3)when the court inquired from Mr. Kenneth Koh on why no learned counsel appeared on behalf of the German Entities, Mr. Kenneth Koh informed the court that the cause papers for the 1st NA [Cause Papers (1st NA)] had not been served on the solicitors for the German Entities, Messrs Chooi & Company + Cheng & Ariff (Messrs CCA).The court then directed Mr. Lim Tuck Sun’s solicitors to serve the Cause Papers (1st NA) on Messrs CCA. This is because even if a court matter has been discontinued against a party (X), if a learned counsel or solicitor (Y) (who has represented X in the case) has filed an application in the case after the discontinuance of the matter, Y should serve all cause papers regarding Y’s application on X. This is in the interest of justice because X is entitled to know of all developments in the case, especially the filing and outcome of an application by X’s own solicitor or counsel in the same case;
  • (4)I inquired from Mr. Kenneth Koh on whether Mr. Lim Tuck Sun wished to be present for the 1st CM. Mr. Kenneth Koh informed the court that Mr. Lim Tuck Sun was waiting outside the court room. I invited Mr. Lim Tuck Sun to be present for the 1st CM as the 1st NA was filed by him. The court also granted leave for Mr. Lim Tuck Sun to attend all subsequent CMs as well as to be present at the hearing and oral decision of the 2 NAs. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Lim Tuck Sun had appointed learned counsel to act for him in the 1st NA, I gave leave for Mr. Lim Tuck Sun to address the court if he wished to do so;
  • (5)Mr. Kenneth Koh tactfully inquired from me on whether I would be hearing the 1st NA. I informed Mr. Kenneth Koh as follows –
    • (a)after my perusal of the Cause Papers (1st NA), my preliminary view was that there was no “real danger of bias” on my part to hear the 1st NA. Hence, I would not recuse myself from hearing the 1st NA during the first CM; and
    • (b)Mr. Lim Tuck Sun had the liberty to file an application to recuse me from hearing the 1st NA (Recusal Application). I assured Mr. Lim Tuck Sun and Mr. Kenneth Koh that if a Recusal Application was subsequently filed, the court would not commence any committal proceedings on the court’s own motion against any person in respect of the Recusal Application; and
  • (6)Mr. Kenneth Koh stated that he had been instructed by Mr. Lim Tuck Sun to file a Recusal Application and applied for another CM to be fixed after the filing of the Recusal Application. I acceded to Mr. Kenneth Koh’s request and fixed a second CM for the 1st NA (2nd CM).

[9]  The Recusal Application was subsequently filed by Mr. Lim Tuck Sun by way of a second NA (2nd NA). This judgment shall refer to –

  • (1)the 1st NA and 2nd NA collectively as the “2 NAs”; and
  • (2)the Intervention Application, Expunction Application and Recusal Application collectively as the “3 Applications”.

[10]  During the 2nd CM –

  • (1)Ms. Ira Biswas A/P Sushil Kumar and Ms. Nicole Fiona Wee Sue-Ren appeared for Messrs CCA. Ms. Ira informed the court that –
    • (a)Messrs CCA had no instruction from the German Entities to receive the Cause Papers (1st NA);
    • (b)Ms. Ira and Ms. Wee attended the 2nd CM as a matter of courtesy and respect for the court; and
    • (c)Ms. Ira and Ms. Wee applied for leave to be excused from all further proceedings regarding the 2 NAs.
    Firstly, Ms. Ira and Ms. Wee were not required to appear for the CM because Messrs CCA had no instruction from the German Entities to act in respect of the 2 NAs. Secondly, Ms. Ira and Ms. Wee did not need leave of court to be excused from all proceedings with regard to the 2 NAs. The above conduct by Ms. Ira and Ms. Wee was in accordance with the finest traditions of the Bar. I expressed my heart-felt gratitude to Ms. Ira and Ms. Wee for attending the 2nd CM beyond the call of their duty to court and their clients. Ms. Ira and Ms. Wee then excused themselves from further proceedings with regard to the 2 NAs;
  • (2)learned counsel for the Plaintiffs, Defendants and TM informed the court that –
    • (a)the Plaintiffs, Defendants and TM would not take any position with regard to the 2 NAs; and
    • (b)learned lead counsel for the Plaintiffs, Defendants and TM kindly offered to act as Amici Curiae (friends of the court) in respect of the 2 NAs.
    I was pleasantly surprised by the selfless act of learned lead counsel for the Plaintiffs, Defendants and TM to act as Amici Curiae regarding the 2 NAs. I have no hesitation to accept this pro bono offer; and
  • (3)this court informed all learned counsel and Mr. Lim Tuck Sun as follows –
    • (a)the court proposed to invite Mr. Robert Lazar (Mr. Lazar), a senior member of the Bar and a highly experienced litigator, to be an Amicus Curiae to assist the court regarding the 2 NAs. There was no objection to this proposal by any learned counsel. Mr. Robert Lazar subsequently accepted the court’s invitation to be an Amicus Curiae in respect of the 2 NAs; and
    • (b)the court stated that Mr. Lim Tuck Sun, Plaintiffs, Defendants and TMB had the right to propose to the court to invite –
      • (i)the Rt. Hon. Attorney General to attend and/or assist the court with regard to the 2 NAs: and/or
      • (ii)a representative from the Bar Council (BC) to be an Amicus Curiae or to hold a Watching Brief (WB) for the BC.
      The above proposals were not taken up by Mr. Lim Tuck Sun, Plaintiffs, Defendants and TMB.

Dato’ Dr Abd Wahab bin Abd Ghani lwn Mohd Rashid bin Mohd Noor dan lain-lain [2023] MLJU 1441

Robin

MAHKAMAH TINGGI (KUALA LUMPUR)
LATIFAH MOHD TAHAR H
GUAMAN SIVIL NO WA-22NCVC-281-05 TAHUN 2018
1 July 2023

ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN

(LAMPIRAN 1 )RAYUAN

[1]  Perayu/ Plaintif tidak berpuashati dengan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 30 Januari 2023 dan merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap sebahagian keputusan seperti berikut:-

  • (a)Bahawa jumlah penyelesaian RM200,000.00 dibayar kepada Defendan Pertama ke dalam akaun peguamcara-anakguam Tetuan P.S. Ranjan & Co.
  • (b)Tuntutan Balas Defendan Pertama dibenarkan sebahagian iaitu faedah 5% terhadap jumlah RM200,000.00 dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga tarikh penyelesaian; dan
  • (c)Kos dibayar oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama sebanyak RM30,000.00, Defendan Kedua sebanyak RM15,000.00 dan Defendan Ketiga sebanyak RM15,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur.

[2]  Pihak-pihak akan dipanggil sebagai Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama, Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga seperti di Mahkamah Tinggi dan pihak-pihak dirujuk kepada Guaman Asal No WA-22NCVC-75-02/2016 ( selepas ini disebut “Guaman 75” ) akan dirujuk seumpamanya seperti guaman tersebut.

Malayan Banking Bhd v Tan Soek Phee & Ors and another appeal [2023] 5 MLJ 507

Robin


COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA)
ABDUL KARIM, ABU BAKAR JAIS AND LIM CHONG FONG JJCA
CIVIL APPEAL NOS W-02(NCVC)(W)-2194–10 OF 2018 AND W-02(NCvC)(W)-2220–10 OF 2018
4 August 2023

Contract — Damages — Loss of opportunity/chance — Whether High Court erred in refusing bank damages for loss of chance/opportunity — Whether Court wrongly held bank had not proven that it had suffered actual loss and that it had no prospect of success in recovering any monies from wound up borrower — Whether borrower’s insolvency or winding up was irrelevant — Whether evidence showed solicitor’s negligence had caused bank to lose opportunity of recovering its loan from borrower and guarantors — Whether bank was entitled to judgment for sum claimed as it was reasonable measure of damages and was not remote

Malayan Banking Bhd v Tan Soek Phee & Ors and another appeal [2023] MLJU 1749

Robin

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA)
ABDUL KARIM ABDUL JALIL, ABU BAKAR JAIS AND LIM CHONG FONG JJCA
CIVIL APPEAL NOS W-02(NCVC)(W)-2194-10 OF 2018 AND W-02(NCvC)(W)-2220-10 OF 2018
4 August 2023

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENTINTRODUCTION

[1]  These are appeals against the trial judgment of the High Court that partially allowed the claim pertaining to solicitor’s professional negligence.

[2]  The learned High Court judge on 25th September 2018 adjudged and ordered as follows:

  • (i)The Defendants are to make payment of the sum of RM127,994.00 to the Plaintiff together with interest on the said amount at 5% per annum from 30th May 2016 until full settlement;
  • (ii)The Plaintiff’s claim for damages for loss of chance is dismissed; and
  • (iii)No order as to costs.

[3]  We have on 10th April 2023 unanimously allowed the Appeal No. W-02(NCVC)(W)-2194-10/2018 (“Appeal 2194”). In this regard, we varied the High Court judgment dated 25th September 2018 by allowing and ordering the Defendants to make payment of the Plaintiff’s claim for damages for loss of a chance and hence judgment was accordingly entered in the sum of RM622,006.00 to the Plaintiff. However, we dismissed Appeal No. W-02(NCVC)(W)-2220 (“Appeal 2220”). There shall be no order as to costs as agreed by the parties.

[4]  We now provide the grounds of judgment below and continue to address the parties as Plaintiff and Defendants for convenience

Lembaga Minyak Sawit Malaysia & Anor v Innovans Palm Industries Sdn Bhd [2023] 2 MLJ 742

Robin

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA)
MOHAMAD ZABIDIN, NANTHA BALAN AND DARRYL GOON JJCA
CIVIL APPEAL NO P-01(A)-172–04 OF 2021
9 September 2021

Administrative Law — Judicial review (‘JR’) — Whether matter was amenable to JR — Director-General (‘DG’) of Malaysian Palm Oil Board (‘MPOB’) refused to release seized palm oil to respondent because the oil was subject of criminal proceedings — Whether DG’s decision was not amenable to JR because reliefs sought in JR application would encroach upon or interfere with magistrate’s jurisdiction to deal with the oil under the Malaysian Palm Oil Board Act 1998 — Whether respondent had not shown any procedural impropriety, abuse of power or mala fides on the part of the DG or the MPOB

Budaya YNS Sdn Bhd v Rembau Galian Sdn Bhd and other cases [2023] MLJU 1045

Robin

HIGH COURT (SEREMBAN)
AZIZUL AZMI ADNAN J
APPEAL NOS NA-12BNCC-3-07 OF 2022, NA-12BNCC-4-07 OF 2022 AND NA-12BNCC-5-07 OF 2022
23 May 2023

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENTINTRODUCTION

[1]  The appellant in this case, Budaya YNS Sdn Bhd, was the defendant in the court below. The respondents and the plaintiffs at first instance, Rembau Galian Sdn Bhd, Permata Ketara Sdn Bhd and Rembau Galian had entered into Sand Excavation Agreements with the appellant dated 7 May 2013, 31 May 2013 and 24 June 2013 respectively.

[2]  In this judgment, the parties are referred to as they were before the court below.

[3]  The plaintiffs sued the defendant in three separate suits at the Sessions Court for breach of the Sand Excavation Agreements. The plaintiffs claimed for the return of deposits sums of RM200,000 that they had each paid to the defendant. In addition, they claimed for loss of profits arising from the contended breach by the defendant of the Agreements. The three suits were heard together at the Sessions Court.

[4]  After a full trial of the actions, the Sessions Court allowed the plaintiff’s claim in part only, for the return of the deposit amounts. The claim for loss of profit was dismissed. The defendant has now appealed against this decision

Jackan Joy @ Victor a/l Rajagopal dan satu lagi lwn Ravintheran a/l Govindasamy dan satu lagi [2023] MLJU 402

Robin

MAHKAMAH TINGGI (KUALA LUMPUR)
LATIFAH MOHD TAHAR H
GUAMAN SIVIL NO WA-22NCVC-69-02 TAHUN 2017
1 March 2023

ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN

(LAMPIRAN 237)RAYUAN

[1]  Perayu / Defendan Kedua (dalam Tuntutan Asal) tidak berpuashati dengan keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 12 Disember 2022 dan kini merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keseluruhan keputusan tersebut yang memutuskan bahawa permohonan Responden-Responden / Plaintif-Plaintif (dalam Tuntutan Asal) untuk memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Perayu / Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Pertama (dalam Tuntutan Asal).

[2]  Pihak-pihak akan disebut sebagai Plaintif-Plaintif, Defendan Pertama, Defendan Kedua, Defendan Ketiga dan juga Defendan-Defendan dalam alasan penghakiman ini.

[3]  Dalam kes ini terdapatnya permohonan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif dibawah Aturan 21 Kaedah 3(1), Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dimana Plaintif- Plaintif di dalam Tuntutan Asal membuat permohonan di bawah peruntukan Aturan 21 Kaedah 3(1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 untuk perintah- perintah bahawa:-

  • a)Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam Tuntutan Asal diberi kebenaran untuk memberhentikan tindakan yang telah difailkan ke atas Defendan-Defendan di dalam Tuntutan Asal;
  • b)Tiada perintah terhadap kos; dan
  • c)Lain-lain relif yang difikirkan suai-manfaat oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini.

[4]  Alasan-alasan permohonan adalah seperti berikut:-

  • 1.Plaintif-Plaintif dalam tuntutan asal telah memfailkan tindakan sekarang ini terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua dalam Tuntutan asal pada10.02.2017.
  • 2.Pada setiap masa yang material Defendan-Defendan dalam Tuntutan Asal telah memfailkan Tuntutan Balas pada 20.03.2017.
  • 3.Plaintif-Plaintif dalam Tuntutan Asal telah menuntut terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua antara lain pembayaran balik Pinjaman Persahabatan berjumlah RM150,000.00 yang diberikan pada Mac 2010.
  • 4.Pada setiap masa yang material pihak-pihak telah memfailkan semua dokumen pra-perbicaraan seperti yang diarahkan oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia in.
  • 5.Akhirnya tindakan sekarang ini telah ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan pada 28.7.2021, 29.7.2021, 30.7.2021, 21.6.2022, 10.8.2022 dan 15.8.2022.
  • 6.Permohonan Pemberhentian tindakan Plaintif-Plaintif ke atas Defendan-Defendan adalah kerana Defendan Pertama telah membuat bayaran sebanyak RM170,000.00 (termasuk kos pembaikpulih hartanah tersebut) kepada Plaintif Pertama pada 02.08.2022.
  • 7.Pemberhentian tindakan Plaintif-Plaintif ke atas Defendan- Defendan adalah wajar kerana tuntutan utama Plaintif-Plaintif dalam tindakan ini telah dijelaskan oleh Defendan Pertama.
  • 8.Permohonan ini adalah bona fide dan akan menjimatkan masa Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan semua pihak dalam tindakan ini.
  • 9.Alasan-alasan lain adalah seperti yang terkandung dalam Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Jackan Joy @ Victor A/L Rajagopal pada 12.09.2022 yang difailkan bersama.